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Abstract—Social storage systems [1], [2], [3] are becoming
increasingly popular compared to the existing data backup
systems like local, centralized and P2P systems. An endogenously
built symmetric social storage model and its aspects like the utility
of each agent, bilateral stability, contentment, and efficiency have
been extensively discussed in [4]. We include heterogeneity in this
model by using the concept of Social Range Matrix from [5].
Now, each agent is concerned about its perceived utility, which
is a linear combination of its utility as well as others utilities
(depending upon whether the pair are friends, enemies or do not
care about each other). We derive conditions when two agents
may want to add or delete a link, and provide an algorithm that
checks if a bilaterally stable network is possible or not. Finally, we
take some special Social Range Matrices and prove that under
certain conditions on network parameters, a bilaterally stable
network is unique.
Index Terms—Social Storage, F2F Backup System, Endoge-
nous and Heterogeneous Network Formation, Bilateral Stability.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
In recent years, social storage (friend-to-friend) is emerging
as an alternative to local (e.g., hard disc), online (e.g., cloud),
and Peer-to-Peer data backup systems. Social storage allows
users to store their data on their social relatives’ (e.g., friends,
colleagues, family, etc.) storage devices. Researchers believe
that social relationships (which are at the core of social
storage) help to mitigate issues like data availability, reliability,
and security.
Initial work in this field has primarily focused on developing
techniques to exogenously build social storage systems, and
performing Quality of Services (QoS) analysis in terms of
data reliability and availability in these systems. A most recent
study in [4] focuses on explicit data backup partner selection,
where agents themselves select their partners. This selection
is studied in a strategic setting, and eventually builds a social
storage network. They model a utility function, which reveals
the benefit an individual receives in a social storage network.
Further, they analyze the network by using bilateral stability
as a solution concept, where no pair of agents add or delete a
link without their mutual consent.
There are several advantages of this approach. First, this
approach makes it possible to incorporate user’s strategic
behavior (in terms of with whom user wants to form social
connections and with whom it does not). Second, this approach
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helps us to predict the following: which network is likely
to emerge; which one is stable (in which no individual has
incentives to alter the structure of the network either by
forming new or deleting existing social connections); and
which one is the best (contended and/ or efficient) from all
the participants point of view.
However, the above strategic setting does not consider het-
erogeneous behavior (e.g., selfless, selfish, etc.) in the network
formation. In this paper, we focus on this aspect. This way,
we make the model close to a real-world scenario. Although,
doing so makes it challenging to deal with the model and as
well as predict its outcome.
To achieve the above, we incorporate the concept of Social
Range Matrix introduced in [5] while exploring different social
relationships between agents. We modify the utility of agents
in the social storage model discussed in [4]. Further, we revisit
the results regarding bilateral stability of such a model.
II. MODEL
Our model is composed of four components. First is sym-
metric social storage. Second is the utility (as derived in [4])
of each agent. Third is Social Range Matrix, which captures
the social relationship between these agents. Fourth is the
perceived utility obtained by combining the second and the
third components.
A symmetric social network g is a data backup network
consisting of N number of agents and a set of links connecting
these agents. A link 〈ij〉 ∈ g represents that the agents i and j
are data backup partners, who store their data on each other’s
shared storage space. In g, pairs of agents share an equal
amount of storage space. Agents perform two actions, link
addition (represented by g + 〈ij〉) and deletion (represented
by g − 〈ij〉).
The utility function in [4] reveals the cost and benefit that
each agent i receives in g and is given by
ui(g) = β ∗ (1− λni(g))− c ∗ ni(g).
This utility function ui(g) consists of the following param-
eters: the agent i’s neighborhood size ni(g); the benefit β
associated with data; the cost c that the agent i incurs to
maintain its neighbours; and the probability of disk failure λ.
Note that c, β, and λ lie between 0 and 1. The utility function
is a combination of two objectives for each agent i. The first
is to minimize the total cost of the links, which is c ∗ ni(g).
The second is to maximize the expected data backup benefit,
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which is β ∗ (1 − λni(g)). Note that from now onwards we
will use ni to represent neighbourhood size of agent i in g.
In our model, we consider three type of agents. First, where
an agent helps to maximize other’s utility (friend). Second,
where an agent aims to decrease other’s utility (enemy).
Third, where an agent does not care about other’s utility
(neutral). Based upon [5], we represent the above kind of
social relationships between pairs of agents in a Social Range
Matrix F . Here, each element fij denotes the above discussed
social relationship between i and j. That is,
fij

> 0 i and j are friend of each other,
< 0 i and j are enemy of each other, and
= 0 i and j do not care about each other.
Also, j ∈ the set of all agents including i and fii > 0.
Many such interesting matrices are possible, for example,
a matrix of all ones mean that all pair of agents are friends,
and a matrix of all zeroes except the diagonal elements means
weak social links.
In our paper, for the sake of simplicity, we use only three
values for fij . That is, 1, -1, and 0 indicating friend, enemy,
neutral, respectively. We also consider that agents give more
importance to other agents utilities than their own utility, i.e.
fii < |fij | for all j.
Now, agents have different social relationships with others,
and hence, their utility not only depends on the structure of
the network but also their social relationships with others. We
define the new utility (of agent i in g) as the perceived utility,
which is defined as follows:
u˜i(g) =
∑
j
fijuj(g). (1)
In this setting, each agent’s objective is to maximize its
perceived utility (which takes care of utilities of other agents).
Thus, the optimization problem is
max (u˜i(g)).
III. CONDITION FOR LINK ADDITION AND DELETION
Link addition between an agent i and an agent j occurs
only when the perceived utilities of both the agents increases,
i.e.
u˜i(g + 〈ij〉) > u˜i(g) (2)
and
u˜j(g + 〈ij〉) > u˜j(g). (3)
For all agents k, except i and j, the neighbourhood size (nk)
remains constant so their utility is the same and cancels out.
Simplifying (2) and (3) with (1), we get that link addition
happens when
fiiλ
ni + fijλ
nj >
(fii + fij) ∗ c
(1− λ) ∗ β and (4)
fiiλ
nj + fijλ
ni >
(fii + fij) ∗ c
(1− λ) ∗ β . (5)
Similarly, link deletion happens when
u˜i(g − 〈ij〉) > u˜i(g)
and
u˜j(g − 〈ij〉) > u˜j(g).
Thus, equivalent to (4) and (5) we get link deletion conditions
as below.
fiiλ
ni + fijλ
nj <
(fii + fij) ∗ c ∗ λ
(1− λ) ∗ β and (6)
fiiλ
nj + fijλ
ni <
(fii + fij) ∗ c ∗ λ
(1− λ) ∗ β . (7)
IV. SUFFICIENCY CONDITION FOR LINK ADDITION
Theorem 1. For any two agents i and j, let t1 = max (ni,
nj), t2 = min (ni, nj) and fij > 0. If t1 <
∣∣ln( c
(1−λ)∗β
)∣∣
|lnλ| , the
link addition conditions (4) and (5) will be true, and hence, a
link will be formed between i and j.
Proof.
Case 1: If ni > nj , then t1 = ni and t2 = nj . Thus,
λni < λnj (since 0 < λ < 1)
or fiiλ
ni < fiiλ
nj (since fii > 0).
Also, fijλ
ni < fijλ
nj (since fij > 0).
Combining above two we get
(fii + fij)λ
ni < fiiλ
ni + fijλ
nj < (fii + fij)λ
nj (8)
and
(fii + fij)λ
ni < fiiλ
nj + fijλ
ni < (fii + fij)λ
nj . (9)
Using (4)–(5) in (8)–(9) we get sufficiency condition for link
addition as below.
(fii + fij)λ
ni >
(fii + fij) ∗ c
(1− λ) ∗ β . (10)
On solving (10), we get that link between i, j will happen if
ni <
∣∣∣ln( c(1−λ)∗β)∣∣∣
|lnλ| .
Case 2: If ni ≤ nj
Since (4) and (5) are symmetric, interchange i and j.
Similarly, we can derive sufficiency conditions when fij <
0 above as well as for link deletion. Algorithm 1 lists the
steps for reaching a bilaterally stable network. That is, when
no agent has any incentive to add or delete a link.
V. CASE STUDY
Consider five agents as follows: a, b, c, d, and e. Assume
that social relationships between these agents is captured in
the Social Range Matrix F given in Table I. As an example,
the way to read this matrix is as follows: a is a friend of b
and d, while it is an enemy of c and e.
Let us also assume that c = 0.01, λ = 0.2,  = 0.1, and
β = 0.1. Initially all agents are isolated (i.e., the starting
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code to arrive at a bilaterally stable
network.
Input : c, λ, β, F, starting network, flag = 1
Comment: i and j are agents, flag = 1 means network is not bilaterally
stable
1 while flag == 1 do
2 flag = 0
3 for i = 1 to n do
4 for j = 1 to n do
5 if i 6= j then
6 if link is absent between < i, j > then
7 Check link addition conditions (4) and (5) for i,
j and add link if they are true.
8 flag = 1
9 end
10 if link is present between < i, j > then
11 Check link deletion conditions (6) and (7) for i,
j and delete link if they are true.
12 flag = 1
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 end
TABLE I: Social Range Matrix F
a b c d e
a  1 -1 1 -1
b 1  1 -1 -1
c -1 1  -1 1
d 1 -1 -1  1
e -1 -1 1 1 
network is a null network). We follow the procedure described
in Algorithm 1 and obtain the bilaterally stable network g′
shown in Fig. 1. With the same set of parameters and F , by
starting from a random non-null network, we obtain a different
bilaterally stable network than in Fig. 1. This implies that
bilaterally stable networks are not necessarily unique.
By looking at the ratio of cβ , where 0 < c, β < 1, λ =
0.2, and above F , we found that for 0.044 < cβ < 0.089,
Algorithm 1 runs into infinite loop implying that no bilaterally
stable network is possible. Interestingly, for all other values of
c
β we found that at least one bilaterally stable network exists.
If c > β, λ = 0.2, and above F , then we get a unique
bilaterally stable network in which all pair of agents are
enemies.
VI. UNIQUE BILATERALLY STABLE NETWORKS
Lemma 1. If cβ < (1− λ)λN−2 and if all agents are friends
of each other (i.e. fij = 1), then a complete network is the
unique bilaterally stable network.
Fig. 1: Bilaterally Stable Social Storage Network g′.
Proof. First, consider the link addition conditions stated in
(4) and (5). We can observe that, as ni and nj increases, the
L.H.S of (4) and (5) decreases. This implies that agents have
an incentive to increase their neighborhood size.
If the link addition conditions (4) and (5) are true for ni =
nj = N − 2 (both agents have the neighborhood size one less
than the maximum possible size)1, then they will be true for
all values of ni, nj < N-2 (if the smaller value of the L.H.S
is greater than the R.H.S., bigger values will be greater).
Solving (4) – (5) with ni = nj = N − 2, i.e.
fiiλ
N−2 + fijλN−2 >
(fii + fij) ∗ c
(1− λ) ∗ β
gives
c
β
< (1− λ)λN−2.
A similar analysis can be done with the deletion conditions.
Lemma 2. If cβ > (1 − λ) and if all agents are friends of
each other (i.e. fij = 1), then the empty network is the unique
bilaterally stable network.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. If cβ >
1
1−fii (1−λ) and if fij is either 1 or -1,
then the bilaterally stable network will be the one where all
the pairs of enemies form links.
VII. FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have extended the social storage model
proposed in [4] to include heterogeneous behavior (variety
of social relationships). After that, we have analyzed this
model using their solution concept of bilateral stability. The
preliminary results here give tremendous insight into how a
endogenously built social storage system would emerge.
Future work involves further analyzing the stability of such
networks as well as studying contentment (when everyone has
maximized their utility) and efficiency (where the total utility
of the network is maximized) in this new heterogeneous agent
scenario.
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